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ATTORNEY- CLIENT FEE LITIGATION IN FEDERAL COURT:
THE PENUMBRA OF SPANOS V. SKOURAS
Robert E. Parella*
INTRODUCTION
The Traditional State Interest in Supervising Attorneys
Attorney-client fee litigation is seldom resolved by resort to
ordinary contract principles. Rather, a number of rules peculiar to the
attorney-client relationship can be invoked in such disputes. These rules
determine issues such as the reasonableness of contingent fees, recovery
after wrongful discharge by the client, illegality of the contract predicated
upon solicitation, and the attorney's lien. Although there is considerable
attorney fee litigation in federal court,' there is a dearth of authoritative
analysis or resolution of the choice of law issue in the cases. Until
recently the easy answer was that state law should govern in all cases.
Most of the rules in question are grounded in general equitable principles
based on the fiduciary relationship of attorney and client2 or supervision
of attorneys as officers of the court.3 As to the former, the Erie doctrine
reinforces the case for state law in the post-Erie decisions. As to the
latter ground, state regulation of the legal profession is predicated upon
strong state interests and a long tradition. The state is concerned with
competent representation of residents, the entire administration of jus-
tice to which lawyers so greatly contribute, the effectiveness of disci-
plinary authority in order to insure high professional ethics, and the eco-
nomic and professional status of the state bar. Moreover, Congress has
not seen fit to enact comprehensive regulation of practice before the
federal courts although such authority is generally conceded and legisla-
tion has been proposed.' Consequently, admission to federal practice
* Associate Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.
1. See MODERN FEDERAL PRACTICE DIGEST, Attorney & Client (1960).
2. More than a century ago the Supreme Court stated in Stockton v. Ford,
52 U.S. 232, 247 (1850) :
There are few of the business relations of life involving a higher trust and
confidence than that of attorney and client, or, generally speaking, one
more honorably or faithfully discharged; few more anxiously guarded by the
law, or governed by sterner principles of morality and justice; and it is
the duty of the court to administer them in a corresponding spirit, and to be
watchful and industrious, to see that confidence thus reposed shall not be
used to the detriment or prejudice of the rights of the party bestowing it.
3. See Gair v. Peck, 6 N.Y.2d 97, 160 N.E.2d 43, 188 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1959),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 374 (1960).
4. See Note, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 731, 738 n.49 (1967).
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generally follows state standards.5
The Independent Federal Interest in Supervision of Attorneys
The above circumstances support the facile assumption that state
interests should dominate the attorney-client relationship. Several recent
developments, however, suggest further analysis and re-examination of
that assumption. A series of Supreme Court decisions have found state
policies directed at champerty and maintenance violative of the First
Amendment freedom to associate and the right to petition for redress of
grievances.6  Similarly, in Sperry v. Florida,7 the state's unauthorized
practice law was held incompatible with Congressional policy in favor of
non-lawyer patent practitioners. These decisions can be viewed as an
emerging body of law concerning situations in which a civil liberty
interest is asserted in a particularized context or where there is an
articulated Congressional policy. The present discussion is concerned with
the more frequently recurring, conventional contexts, such as judicial
scrutiny of contingent fee contracts, wherein the federal interest is rather
vague or subtle and consequently ill-defined.'
As indicated above, admission to federal practice has generally
followed state standards. Nonetheless, in an opinion of recent date, the
Supreme Court stated without dissent, "The two judicial systems of
courts, the state judicatures and the federal judiciary, have autonomous
control over the conduct of their officers among whom, in the present
context, lawyers are included."9 Therefore, federal disbarment does not
automatically follow state disbarment, even though "a lawyer is admitted
into a federal court by way of a state court."1 The federal courts, then,
have an independent interest in supervising the conduct of attorneys
practicing before them-an interest rooted in disciplinary authority and
concern for the administration of justice in federal courts, neither of
which is wholly identical with analagous state interests.
Further analytical difficulties are posed because the choice of law
issue can arise in several distinct contexts-distinguishable as to the
basis of jurisdiction invoked by the plaintiff or the nature and source of
the right sued upon. These contexts may include: 1) a suit invoking
5. See Comment, 19 STAN. L. REv. 856, 863 n.41 (1967).
6. United Mineworkers of America, Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n., 389
U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State
Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 377 U.S. 415 (1963). See Zimroth,
Group Legal Services and the Constitution, 76 YALE L.J. 966 (1966).
7. 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
8. Completely outside the present discussion are matters of due process in bar
admission procedures and right of counsel in criminal cases.
9. See, e.g., Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278 (1957).
10. Id. at 281.
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diversity jurisdiction where the legal services were previously rendered
in a state court proceeding; 2) a suit invoking diversity jurisdiction after
a prior federal court proceeding; 3) a petition in the original federal court
proceeding predicated upon ancillary jurisdiction.1 As a source of poten-
tial conflict between state and federal interests it is evident that the fed-
eral interest is less appreciable in the first situation above and stronger
when the client's original claim is a federal one.
The Federal-State Conflict Posed
At this point one may hypothesize a problem of accommodating or
reconciling federal-state interests because a state rule impedes some
federal interest or because of some supposed demand for national uni-
formity. This putative federal-state conflict turns, then, upon whether
the federal courts should develop a "federal common law" for attorney
fee litigation, at least in the strongest context: legal services rendered
in connection with a federal claim cognizable only in federal court.'
Seventeen years ago, Judge Wyzanski put the question thus:
But does it do violence to Article III of the United States
Consititution and to the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the
United States Constitution for a state legislature to regulate
the substantive relationship between a litigant in the federal
courts and his counsel? It might be argued that (1) it is the
United States Court acting under Article III and statutes and
rules pursuant thereto that admits the attorney to practice before
it, (2) his conduct and his rights in connection with litigation
in United States Courts are, therefore, the exclusive concern of
the United States and (3) because of the Supremacy Clause of
Article VI . . . no state can govern the relationship of the
attorney and of the client in the United States Courts.1
Judge Wyzanski left the question unanswered as to legal services
rendered in connection with federal claims. The question before him
involved an attorney's claim for the value of his services and for a lien
pursuant to the Massachusetts statute. The original suit was a personal
injury action filed in federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.
In such a case it was felt that the Erie doctrine controlled and that the
11. Woodbury v. Andrew Jergens Co., 69 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1934) is the founda-
tion case for this basis of jurisdiction. There are many other variations, e.g., lawsuit
not commenced and legal services before a state or federal administrative agency.
12. See generally Friendly, In Praise of Erie--and of the New Federal Common
Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 383 (1964); Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal
Courts: Constitutional Pre-emption, 67 CoLum. L. RFv. 1024 (1967).
13. In re Hoy's Claim, 93 F. Supp. 265, 267 (D. Mass. 1950). Judge Wyzanski
so held ten years later.
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state statute would be applicable if the claim were pressed in federal court
on the basis of ancillary jurisdiction.
The Spanos Case: A Constitutional Right to Engage an Out-of-State
Attorney
The issue posed by Judge Wyzanski, as a possible rule of primary,
rather than interstitial, applicability remained dormant until the recent
decision in Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp.14 In that decision,
the Second Circuit, in a very narrow holding, resolved a conflict between
a state statute and the federal interest served by the client's freedom of
choice in retaining a non-resident expert in connection with a federal
claim in federal court. Plaintiff-attorney Spanos had established himself
as an expert in anti-trust law. He was retained by Skouras to work on a
contemplated and later pending anti-trust suit in the Southern District
of New York. Spanos, at that time a non-resident, was retained to work
in association with local attorneys. He was not admitted to practice in
New York state courts or in the Southern District, nor did he apply for
admission pro hac vice. After the anti-trust suit was settled, Spanos was
discharged; he then brought the instant action, based on diversity juris-
diction, for the value of his legal services. The defendant raised the
defense of illegality, relying on a New York penal statute directed at
unauthorized practice of law within the state and New York decisions
precluding recovery of fees under such circumstances. The three-judge
panel sustained the defense, Judge Friendly dissenting. On reconsidera-
tion en banc, the court, in an opinion by Judge Friendly, affirmed the
district court judgment in favor of Spanos. The majority opinion
initially approached the matter as a basic contract question and found an
estoppel basis in the discharge of Spanos and, perhaps, in failure of the
New York attorneys to secure admission pro hac vice for their colleague.
But the court was not content with that rationale. It went on to hold
that "under the privileges and immunities clause of the Constitution no
state can prohibit a citizen with a federal claim or defense from engaging
an out-of-state lawyer to collaborate with an in-state lawyer and give
legal advice concerning it within the state."1  Consequently, the con-
stitutional guarantee must include what is necessary and appropriate
for its assertion: that the state law yield. Not only the risk of criminal
prosecution but also the rule precluding recovery of fees presented con-
stitutional obstacles. In deference to the state interest in the premises,
however, the court expressly limited its holding to the situation before it.
14. 364 F.2d 161, rev'd on rehearing en banc, 364 F.2d 168 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 987 (1966).
15. Id. at 170.
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Attorney Regulation as a Restriction upon Assertion of Federal Claims
The Spanos case and other recent developments have important
implications for the conventional attorney-client questions under con-
sideration here. As to Spanos itself, much will turn upon whether it is
narrowly interpreted or whether a broader interpretation will spawn
progeny in related areas and thus move the law in the direction suggested
by Judge Wyzanski's dictum. Because the client's constitutional right
filtered down to the attorney's claim for his fee, an inquiry is suggested
into other areas of attorney compensation and state restrictions thereon.1"
In this regard, the entire court was in agreement that admission pro
hac vice would have insulated Spanos from the force of the New York
statute." Indeed, this point was the thrust of the dissenting opinion-
Spanos could have obtained such admission but did not.
Focus on this aspect of the case and a broad interpretation yield
the following exegesis. The New York statute does not effect an absolute
prohibition against choice of out-of-state counsel or recovery of his fee.
Admission pro hac vice accommodates the federal interest as well as the
state interest by insuring that persons practicing within the state are
screened at an appropriate level. Consequently, the finding of a con-
stitutional right relates as much to the ease with which Spanos can recover
his fee as to whether he can recover it at all. On this theory, any state
rule governing the contractual relations of attorney and client would
have to be measured against its restrictive effect upon assertion of a
federal claim in federal court. 8
Other developments include related Supreme Court holdings in the
civil liberties context 9 as well as the decision in Sperry v. United States2
and Theard v. United States.21 Moreover, the layman today is arguably
more knowledgeable, sophisticated and litigious in his relations with practi-
16. In Spanos, plaintiff argued that an attorney's compensation for services in
federal court should be governed by federal law. Brief for Petitioner on Rehearing.
More recently the Supreme Court was asked to resolve this question. Shiya v.
National Committee of Gibran, 381 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
1048 (1968) (contingent fee proceeding ancillary to copyright litigation). It should be
noted that the contract-estoppel theory employed in Spanos was not supported by New
York decisions and is subject to criticism.
17. The district judge's attitude seemed to be that such admission was a mere
formality under the circumstances. Spanos v. Skouras, 235 F. Supp. 1, 11 (S.D.N.Y.
1964).
18. See discussion of the "balancing" approach in United Mineworkers of America,
Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n., 389 U.S. 217, 227-28 (Harlan J., dissenting).
See also Cheatham, The Reach of Federal Action Over the Profession of Law, 18
STAN L. REV. 1288, 1293 (1966).
19. Stockton v. Ford, 52 U.S. 232 (1850) ; see note 2 supra.
20. 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
21. 354 U.S. 278 (1957).
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tioners in the learned professions." Lawsuits between attorneys and
their former clients are apt to be contested bitterly, with either party
pressing for some favorable variation or nuance of meaning in the avail-
able rules of decision.
Federal opinions of the past dealing with what are herein described
as the conventional questions fall into three categories. Many cite and
apply state law;2" others cite both federal and state authorities;"4
still others discuss general principles without any citation of authority. 5
The purpose here is to consider general principles controlling choice of
law in this area and then to re-examine some specific problems, especially
scrutiny of the contingent fee contract, in light of the recent developments
indicated above. Ultimately, the objective is to determine whether there
is a future for Judge Wyzanski's dictum.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
At the outset, some basic assumptions and limitations are in order.
First, it is assumed that the rules governing the attorney's contractual
relations with his client are "substantive" insofar as the Erie doctrine
might be applicable; thus, if state law is displaced in such a case it will
be attributed to some over-riding federal policy.26 Second, the dis-
cussion above fairly indicates that the proper reference for rules of
decision cannot be found in the usually reliable, mechanical approach-
focusing only on the basis of jurisdiction invoked;"1 the nature of the
claim or source of the right will often be determinative. Finally, the
present discussion assumes the case in which the client's original claim
is a federal one. If the action would have to be brought in federal court
solely on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, the arguments for state
law and the Erie doctrine are usually compelling. The state interests
are very strong in such a case and the federal interest correspondingly
reduced. Further, it is difficult to imagine a more odious form of forum
22. In the present cascade of printed material, it is not insignificant that best-
seller lists include a book dealing, basically, with how to avoid lawyers, and which
engaged the attention of bar associations as well as book clubs. See New York
County Lawyers' Ass'n v. Dacey, 28 App. Div. 2d 161, 283 N.Y.S.2d 984 (1st Dep't
1967). See also Blaustein, What Do Laymen Think of Lawyers? Polls Show the
Need for Better Public Relations, 38 A.B.A.J. 39 (1952).
23. E.g., United States v. Transocean Airlines, Inc., 356 F.2d 702 (5th Cir.
1966); Pitcher Construction Co. v. United States, 322 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1963);
Carter v. Spanos, 250 F.2d 814 (8th Cir. 1958); Sharor v. Pollia, 191 F.2d 116
(10th Cir. 1951).
24. E.g., Gray v. Joseph J. Brunetti Constr. Co., 266 F.2d 809 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 826 (1959) ; Falcone v. Hall, 235 F.2d 860 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
25. E.g., Shiya v. National Committee of Gibran, 381 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1048 (1968) ; In re Kuflik, 342 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1965).
26. Cf. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
27. 1 A. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 305 (3), § 324 (1965).
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shopping than that designed to secure for the attorney an advantage
over his client.28
The Supremacy Clause and Specific Congressional Policy
Sperry v. Florida is the Supreme Court opinion closest to the
present inquiry.2" The Florida Bar instituted a proceeding in a state
court to enjoin a non-lawyer from acting as a patent practitioner in the
state of Florida. The Court held that under the supremacy clause state
law must yield. The applicable federal statute authorized non-lawyer
patent practice as did the administrative regulations. Moreover, the
Court was able to cite a long and impressive history in support of a
congressional determination that non-lawyers be admitted to practice
before the Patent Office. The Court stated:
Nor do we doubt that Florida has a substantial interest in
regulating the practice of law within the State and that, in
the absence of federal legislation, it could validly prohibit non-
lawyers from engaging in this circumscribed form of patent
practice. .. . But the law of the State, though enacted in the
exercise of powers not controverted, must yield when incom-
patible with federal legislation."0
Sperry in no way supports a wholesale displacement of state
law with respect to the relation of attorney and litigant in federal court.
In Sperry there was a very specific congressional policy and sharp
conflict between that policy and state law. In marked contrast is the
general delegation to the district courts of authority to make rules
governing admission to practice in those courts. Moreover, the patent
law area is especially inviting for assertion of the supremacy clause,
not only because of the esoteric nature of the subject, but primarily
because of the strong national interest in its relation to our competitive
enterprise and anti-trust policy. 1 In a different context, but also in-
volving patents, the Supreme Court has said:
But the doctrine of (Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins) is inapplicable
to those areas of judicial decision within which the policy of
the law is so dominated by the sweep of federal statutes that
legal relations which they affect must be deemed governed by
28. See Espaillat v. A.H. Bull S.S. Co., 152 F. Supp. 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1957)
(reliance on New York percentage schedule).
29. 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
30. Id. at 383.
31. Cf. Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco
Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
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federal law having its source in those statutes, rather than by
local law.82
The Post-Erie Remnants of a Federal Common Law
Other recent cases shed light on the Court's attitude when con-
gressional policy is not clearly articulated or when the conflict with
state law or the need for national uniformity is less evident than in
the above situation.
Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp.3 involved the validity
of assignments of a lease of public lands. The lease application had been
filed with the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to federal acts governing
"acquired lands" and "public domain lands." The district court held the
oral assignment ineffective under Louisiana law, the situs of the pro-
perty. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and re-
manded for a new trial governed by federal law. On certiorari, the
Supreme Court reversed and held that Louisiana law should apply. Justice
Harlan's opinion for eight members of the Court stated:
In deciding whether rules of federal common law should be
fashioned, normally the guiding principle is that a significant
conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of
state law in the premises must first be specifically shown. It
is by no means enough that, as we may assume, Congress
could under the Constitution readily enact a complete code of
law governing transactions in federal mineral leases among
private parties. Whether latent power should be exercised to
displace state law is primarily a decision for Congress. Even
where there is related federal legislation in an area, as is true
in this instance, it must be remembered that "Congress acts
. . . against the background of the total corpus juris of the
states.. . ." Because we find no significant threat to any identi-
fiable federal policy or interest, we do not press on to consider
other questions relevant to invoking federal common law, such
as the strength of the state interest in having its own rules
govern . . . the feasibility of creating a judicial substitute...
and other similar factors. 4
The case is instructive in that the federal act comprehensively regulated
various aspects of the leasing process and included a section providing
32. Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942).
33. 384 U.S. 63 (1966).
34. Id. at 68-69.
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that oil and gas leases shall be assignable. 5 Moreover, there was an
intimation in the court of appeals that federal law might yield a different
result." Nonetheless, the Court rejected the argument for federal law
as having "no force in this instance because Louisiana concedely provides
a quite feasible route for transferring any mineral lease.""7  As to
any federal interest in the premises, the Court stated, "Apart from the
highly abstract nature of this interest, there was no showing that
state law is not adequate to achieve it."" s
International Union v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp.9 presented the
question of the proper statute of limitations applicable, in federal court,
to actions for violation of a collective bargaining agreement under
section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. Section 301
was silent on the issue. Notwithstanding the resultant lack of uniformity,
the majority held that state statutes should apply. The Court considered
the situation inappropriate for "judicial inventiveness" in fashioning a
judicial substitute. United States v. Yazell ° involved the applicability
of the Texas law of coverture to a wife's liability on a disaster loan from
the Small Business Administration. Again the majority held that Texas
law was applicable.41
These very recent decisions confirm an attitude expressed in an
earlier case: "As respects the creation by the federal courts of common-
law rights, it is perhaps needless to state that we are not in the free-
wheeling days ante-dating Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins. The instances
where we have created federal common law are few and restricted." '42
Together, these cases admonish against displacement of state law merely
because some federal interest has been located. Instead, a plethora of
factors must be evaluated: the strength of the state interest; an identifi-
able, concrete federal policy and a significant threat thereto; a high
degree of specificity in federal legislation that may be relevant; a demand
rather than mere opportunity to achieve national uniformity; the feasi-
bility of judicial substitutes for state law and, in that regard, the drain
of judicial energy as compared with the convenience and certainty of
35. Id. at 69.
36. Id. at 67 n.5.
37. Id. at 70.
38. Id. at 71.
39. 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
40. 382 U.S. 341 (1966).
41. Although the holding is narrow in that the Court emphasized that the loan
was a "custom-made, hand-tailored, specifically negotiated contract," the context of
United States as a party is strong. 382 U.S. at 348 (1966). See The Law-Making
Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Pre-emption, supra note 12.
42. Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963).
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an already developed body of state law ;4" whether state law is adequate
to achieve the federal interest; and, the degree of difficulty in determin-
ing which state rule to apply."
The Wallis case, especially as supported by the rationale in Sperry,"5
suggests that even uniform rules for admission to practice before the
federal courts would be significant only with respect to the precise
matter to which such rules might be addressed. It is against this back-
drop that a few representative problems will now be considered. In
many cases these factors will militate in favor of state law even though
there is some federal interest in the premises.
SOME TYPICAL ISSUES
Judicial Scrutiny of Contingent Fee Contracts
The contingent fee contract now enjoys a traditional status although
its pros and cons are still debated. 6 Where the balance lies, in evaluating
its social utility, cannot be established empirically; to abolish it alto-
gether would seem a "noble experiment" of sorts. What is clear, how-
ever, is that the contingent fee generates more antagonism and litiga-
tion between attorney and client than any other issue. The successful
plaintiff will scrutinize, with hindsight, the efforts of his attorney. He
is not impressed by the fact that part of his bill is justified by other
instances in which a less fortunate plaintiff, along with the attorney,
realized no recovery at all.
All jurisdictions agree that at some point a contingent fee contract
will be set aside under judicial scrutiny and the attorney relegated to a
quantum reruit recovery." That point, polarized as to the intensity of
the adjectival phrases, may be when it is "unreasonable" or when it
amounts to "perpetration of a fraud." Other expressions include "un-
conscionable," "over-reaching," "in a clear case," etc. For present pur-
poses the question is whether there is anything of substance in these
variations. Much of the literature suggests that there is.
It is evident that the amount of the fee is not to be measured
43. See Sears v. Austin, 292 F.2d 690, 695 (9th Cir. 1961).
44. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 357 n.34 (1966). Generally, with
respect to attorney fee contracts, the place where the services are to be rendered can
be ascertained and should be controlling. Peresipka v. Elgin J. & E.R. Co., 231 F.
2d 268 (7th Cir. 1956) ; Lehigh & N.E.R. Co. v. Finnerty, 61 F.2d 289 (3d Cir. 1932);
Cf. Hoxsey v. Hoffpauir, 180 F.2d 84 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 953 (1950).
45. 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
46. See Radin, Contingent Fees in California, 28 CALIF. L. REV. 587 (1940);
Youngwood, The Contingent Fee-A Reasonable Alternative., 28 MODERN L. REV.
330 (1965) ; Note, 54 Ky. L.J. 155 (1965).
47. See 7 C.J.S. Attorney & Client & 186(b) (1937); 7 Am. JUR. 2d Attorneys
at Law § 215 (1963).
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exclusivley against the reasonable value of the services. Authorities agree
that the risk and uncertainty of compensation is a relevant, evidentiary
consideration.4 8 Moreover, it is patently unsound to equate an un-
reasonable fee with that which is greater than the reasonable value of
the services. It would make the contingent fee contract illusory from
the viewpoint of the attorney, thereby frustrating the very purpose it was
designed to serve, and fomenting potentially endless litigation of a sort
that would embarrass the entire judicial process. Likewise, equity pre-
cedents dealing with inadequacy of consideration are not a reliable
guide because of the risk and uncertainty of compensation.
The opinions in Gair v. Peck49 contain extensive discussion of the
contingent fee contract. The suit was for a declaratory judgment as to
the validity of court rules providing a percentage schedule for contingent
fees in personal injury and death actions. In sustaining the rules against
several attacks, the court stated:
Contingent fees may be disallowed as between attorney and
client in spite of contingent fee retainer agreements where the
amount becomes large enough to be out of all proportion to the
value of the services rendered. It matters little whether under
such circumstances the "formula be that the size of the fee
becomes 'unconscionable' or 'unreasonable.'" Each word means
the same thing in this context.5"
Elsewhere in the majority opinion the court used or quoted ap-
provingly the following expressions: "exorbitant," "unfair advantage,"
"legal fraud perpetrated," "unfair," "oppressive and overreaching." 1
The decision goes far in laying these variations to rest as semantic.
Perhaps the standard employed in this area cannot be refined beyond
the various verbal formulae and relevant evidentiary factors. Nonetheless
it is believed that all jurisdictions adhere to the same basic standard
with the ordinary allowance for different factual conclusions by different
triers of fact. The same conclusion is offered with respect to other
verbalizations that can be put in juxtaposition for their apparent con-
48. See 7 AM. JUR. 2d Attorneys at Law § 250 (1963). Canon 13 of the
American Bar Association provides:
A contract for a contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be
reasonable under all the circumstances of the case, including the risk and un-
certainty of the compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision
of a court, as to its reasonableness.
New Jersey law is now in harmony with the general rule. In re Quinn, 25 N.J. 284,
135 A.2d 869 (1957).
49. Gair v. Peck, 6 N.Y.2d 97, 160 N.E.2d 43, 188 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1959).
50. Id. at 106, 160 N.E.2d at 48, 188 N.Y.S.2d at 497. (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 106-07, 160 N.E.2d at 48-49, 188 N.Y.S.2d at 497-98.
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flict. For example, it is stated that a contingent fee contract will be
enforced according to its terms as any other contract52 and, on the
other hand, that such a contract will be strictly construed in favor of the
client.5" As noted above, no dissent has been found from the proposition
that at some point the contract will be set aside. Further, so-called rules
of strict construction have been characterized as secondary rules of
interpretation to be employed when other standards fail.5" An analysis
of the cases indicates that the courts resolve problems of interpretation
according to the usual standards if the amount of the fee is not un-
conscionable.5" Strict construction is resorted to here, as in other
areas, as a make-weight when the attorney presses for an unreasonable
interpretation," when there is overreaching and abuse of confidence"
or when the contract is hopelessly ambiguous.5"
It is submitted, then, that in this very important and sensitive
area, the law is substantially uniform and well-established; variations
in the verbal formulae encountered are "non-substantial or trivial," 59
and the strong state interest in the premises protect the federal interest.
Within the framework of general principles outlined above, there should
be little temptation to displace state law. Even in the case of an out-of-
state attorney, the Spanos context, the right of the client can hardly
require a departure from general principles embraced in all jurisdictions
in substantially the same form, and, consequently, a limitation on the
attorney's freedom of contract everywhere. In this posture of the law, it
52. See, e.g., Carter v. Spanos, 250 F.2d 814, 816 (8th Cir. 1958); Bryant v.
Hand, 404 P.2d 521 (Colo. 1965).
53. See, e.g., Agnew v. Fort Myers Drainage Dist., 69 F.2d 244, 246 (5th Cir.
1934) ; Ridge v. Healy, 251 F. 798, 804 (8th Cir. 1918).
54. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 236 (1932); 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§
602A, 618-26 (3d ed. 1961).
55. Shiya v. National Committee of Gibran, 381 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1967); Gray
v. Joseph J. Brunetti Constr. Co., 266 F.2d 809 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 826(1959); Unterberg v. Therm-air Mfg. Co., Inc., 14 N.Y.2d 859, 200 N.E.2d 776,
252 N.Y.S.2d 92 (1964), rev'g 20 App. Div. 2d 260, 246 N.Y.S.2d 907; Seligson, Morris
& Neuberger v. Fairbanks Whitney Corp., 22 App. Div. 2d 625, 257 N.Y.S.2d 706(1965); McAvoy v. Schramme, 219 App. Div. 604, 220 N.Y. S.423, a!f'd mem.,
245 N.Y. 575, 157 N.E. 863 (1927).
56. Agnew v. Fort Myers Drainage Dist., 69 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1934); Lane v.
Wilkins, 229 Cal. App. 2d 315, 40 Cal. Rep. 309 (1964) (percentage formula); Hawke
v. Dorf, 148 App. Div. 326, 133 N.Y. S.23 (1911); Samuels v. Simpson, 144 App.
Div. 466, 129 N.Y. S.534 (1911).
57. Ridge v. Healy, 251 F. 798 (8th Cir. 1918); Race v. Harris, 246 App. Div.
367, 286 N.Y. S.168 (1936); In re Smith's Will, 11 Misc. 2d 170, 170 N.Y.S.2d
27 (1958) ; In re Vaupel's Estate, 37 N.Y.S.2d 853, aff'd, 266 App. Div. 723, 40 N.Y.S.
2d 956 (1942).
58. Samuels v. Simpson, 144 App. Div. 466, 129 N.Y. S.534 (1911).
59. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965). Non-substantial variations
reduce problems of forum-shopping and unequal protection of laws; but they also
reduce the need for national uniformity and over-refinement of issues. Cf. Wallis v.
Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 n.5 (1966).
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is understandable that federal opinions do not belabor the appropriate
reference for rules of decision. 0
Wrongful Discharge, the Attorney's Lien, Champertous Contracts
Three other issues will be discussed briefly. Together with the
contingent fee, they constitute the great bulk of attorney-client litigation.
The questions involve: 1) wrongful discharge; 2) the attorney's lien;
and, 3) contracts attacked as champertous because of a provision that
the attorney will pay expenses.
In cases of wrongful discharge, there is disagreement as to the
proper measure of recovery by the attorney. The majority allow recovery
of the full stipulated fee while other jurisdictions restrict the attorney to
a quantum meruit recovery."' The latter obviously find a stronger
policy in favor of the client's choice of attorney. Federal decisions in
this area cite and apply state law. 2
The second question is the attorney's lien. Many states have statutes
providing for such liens and there are variations with respect to the
extent of the lien, when it attaches, and whether a common law lien
exists apart from statute.6 3 A large number of federal decisions apply
the state statutes.6" In absence of any state protection, the decisions do
not enforce an independently created "federal" lien.65
The third question involves the contract defense of illegality because
of the champertous nature of the contract. Here also, variations are
encountered as to whether certain contracts are unenforceable and, if
unenforceable, whether the attorney can recover on a quantum meruit
60. One possibly errant decision is Gray v. Joseph J. Brunetti Constr. Co.,
266 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1959). The legal services were rendered before a federal
agency. Suit was brought in New Jersey by plaintiff-attorney who was not admitted
to practice in New Jersey courts or in the district court Because he was not an
"officer" of either court, it was held that the contingent fee contracted for could not
be reduced. This is a rather narrow view of the court's supervisory role as well as
the fiduciary relationship. In any event, the court further indicated that the contract
met New Jersey standards of fairness.
61. See ANNoT., 54 A.L.R.2d 604 (1957). The statement in the text is over-
simplified. There are further refinements depending on whether the contract is for a
fixed fee, contingent or mixed.
62. Dombey v. Detroit T. & I.R. Co., 351 F.2d 121, 127 (6th Cir. 1965); Batter
v. Williams, 316 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1963); Gangwere v. Bernstein, 199 F. Supp. 38
(S.D.N.Y. 1961); Schartz v. Broadcast Music, 130 F. Supp. 956, 958 n.1 (S.D.N.Y.
1961) ; Casebolt v. Mid-Continent Airlines, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 915 (D. Minn. 1949).
63. See 7 C.J.S. Attorney & Client §§ 207-38 (1937); 7 Am. Ju. 2d §§
272-308 (1963).
64. See MODERN FEDERAL PRACTICE DIGEST, Attorney & Client, Key Nos. 171-
74 (1960).
65. Pitcher Constr. Co. v. United States, 322 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1963) ; Donaldson
v. Gaudio, 260 F.2d 333 (10th Cir. 1958).
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basis.6" Again, federal decisions6" look to state law for guidance except
to the extent that Supreme Court holdings 8 displace the state law of
champerty and maintenance.
Divergent State Rules as a Source of Potential Conflict
In these above three areas, unlike scrutiny of contingent fee con-
tracts discussed previously, there are divergent rules in the various
jurisdictions. The argument for federal law would be predicated upon
some significant federal interest impeded by one or another of these
rules. That argument could be developed in either of two opposite
directions-either the state rule represents a laxity inconsistent with the
proper standards of ethics for federal court, or the state restrictions
upon the attorney unduly impede the client in his choice of counsel for
prosecution of a federal claim. The former is rejected out of hand. It is
difficult to see any identifiable over-riding federal policy requiring a
determination, for example, that a discharged attorney recover only the
reasonable value of his services rather than the stipulated fee.
The latter requires further analysis and the Spanos case is the
appropriate point of reference. In that regard, the present discussion
assumes either a resident or non-resident attorney. It might be argued,
as an extension of Spanos, that state limitations on the measure of the
attorney's recovery, or his security, unduly impede the right of the client.
This conclusion is also rejected.
Initially, Spanos is pregnant with analytical difficulties-in finding
protection for a corporation in the privileges and immunities clause and
in allowing the attorney to raise the constitutional right of another.6 9
Further, the majority refused to let the matter turn on admission
pro hac vice, as the dissenters would have. It is suggested that this
represents neither a cavalier disregard for New York policy nor an
attitude that admission pro hac vice is purely formal; but rather a
concern for situations in which no action is pending and the attorney's
advice is sought in an extra-litigation context. A further observation on
the narrow holding in Spanos lies in its important implications in the
civil rights field, presumably alluded to in the Court's mention of the
need for a non-resident attorney in connection with locally unpopular
causes. 7
66. See ANNOTS., 8 A.L.R.3d 1155 (1966), 100 A.L.R.2d 1378 (1965).
67. Kenrich Corp. v. Miller, 377 F.2d 312 (3d Cir. 1967) ; Dombey v. Detroit
T. & I.R. Co., 351 F.2d 121, 128-30 (6th Cir. 1965) ; Van Bergh v. Simons, 286 F.2d 325
(2d Cir. 1961) ; Application of Kamerman, 278 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1960).
68. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
69. See Comment, 19 STAN. L. REV. 856, 858-61 (1967).
70. See Note, 67 COLUm. L. Rav. 731, 734-35 (1967).
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The common sense of the situation is that the Spanos decision is
directed at state policy that withdraws a large number of attorneys
from the client's available choices. Analytically, then, Spanos should be
interpreted as a case in which state rules effectively precluded the
attorney-client relationship altogether. State policy that permits the con-
tractual relationship, but regulates it in varying degrees, should stand
on a different footing. Such a position is consistent with the general
principles gleaned from Supreme Court opinions and discussed above in
part two. This conclusion, especially with reference to the issue of
champerty, calls for brief comment on NAACP v. Button,71 Brother-
hood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel Virginia State Bar7 2
and United Mineworkers of America, Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar
Ass'n. Narrow readings of Button and Brotherhood would produce
a strict rule: political expression and federal claim, respectively, are
no longer possible and, in fact, were explicitly rejected in United Mine-
workers. Nonetheless, the discussion above assumes that these cases
will not be extended to the ordinary form of solicitation for profit, at
least where there is no right of association involved. In all three cases
the Court acknowledged the strong state interest in regulating the legal
profession and noted that the supposed substantive evils did not materi-
alize in the cooperative programs under review.7"
In Greenberg v. Panama Transportation Co.,7" Judge Wyzanski held
that solicitation in connection with a federal claim presented in federal
court should be determined by a uniform national rule. This proposition
is not supported by the conclusions reached herein. As a broad for-
mulation, applicable to all federal claims, it is rejected on the theory
that 1) the First Amendment, as stated above, does not reach so far
and 2) one should not infer a congressional policy incompatible with
the traditional body of state law. As to the Jones Act-the situation in
the Greenberg case--certainly there is a policy in favor of assertion of
71. 377 U.S. 415 (1963). This case is discussed earlier in the article. See note 6
supra and accompanying text.
72. 377 U.S. 1 (1964). This case is discussed earlier in the article. See note 6
supra and accompanying text.
73. 389 U.S. 217 (1967). This case is discussed earlier in the article. See note
6 supra and accompanying text.
74. See Hackin v. Arizona, 389 U.S. 143 (1967) dismissing an appeal from an
unauthorized practice conviction attacked on constitutional grounds. Justice Douglas,
dissenting, spoke of "charitable efforts" of non-lawyers offered for "no personal
profit." A present grave concern is the matter of accommodating legal services under
the Poverty Program with local policy. Application of Community Action for Legal
Services, 26 App. Div. 2d 354, 274 N.Y.S.2d 779 (1966). See Pye, The Role of Legal
Services in the Antipoverty Program, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 211, 214 n.25.
75. 185 F. Supp. 320, 324 (D. Mass. 1960), revd on other grounds, 290 F.2d
125, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 891 (1961).
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employee claims. It is doubted, however, that this policy should be found
so encouraging as to sanction champertous practices, especially when
there is concurrent jurisdiction in the state courts. "It must be remem-
bered that 'Congress acts ... against the background of the total corpus
juris of the states. ...
Rules that Primarily Affect the Conduct of Litigation
To conclude this discussion of illustrative problems, two federal
decisions will be noted in which the courts pursued an independent path.
In a conflict of interest case, an attorney was disqualified from repre-
senting the plaintiff against a defendant formerly represented by the
attorney in the same transaction; the court expressly rejected the
Erie doctrine."' In connection with an order substituting attorneys and
conditioned on posting security, the Second Circuit has likewise found
Erie inapplicable."' The primary interest promoted by principles govern-
ing substitution of attorneys and conflict of interest is the efficient
administration of justice in the particular lawsuit. When that lawsuit
involves a federal claim, the state interest is considerably weakened.
But quite apart from the strength of the state interest, rules that vitally
affect the conduct of particular litigation before the court are properly an
independent federal concern. The conflict of interest issue is especially
significant, affecting, as it does, discovery procedures under the Federal
Rules. The strong federal interest here should distinguish this type of
case and over-ride state law whether the suit involves a federal claim or
solely diverse citizenship.
CONCLUSION
The proposition that an attorney's relationship with a litigant in
federal court is the exclusive concern of the United States cannot be
maintained. State law is applicable with respect to many problems. This
is entirely consistent with Supreme Court pronouncements as well as the
practice in many federal district courts. The state interest in the
premises is very strong and frequently achieves, or at least does not
threaten, the federal interest. To pursue a policy that emphasizes dif-
ferences with state rules would fragmentize the law of professional
76. Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966). Judge
Wyzanski's opinion in Greenberg is not explicit as to what state rules were rejected.
Perhaps the unique Massachusetts attitude toward contingent fees contributed to his
disposition of the case. See Hughes, The Contingent Fee Contract in Massachusetts,
43 B.U.L. REV. 1 (1963).
77. Cord v. Smith, 338 F.2d 516, 524 (9th Cir. 1964).
78. National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Mercury Typesetting Co., 323 F.2d 784,
786 n.1 (2d Cir. 1963).
79. Cf. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
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conduct in a fashion reminiscent of the era prior to the Zerie case.
Federal policy, however, will displace state law in certain areas which
are still emerging. The following listing of those areas is neither
categorical nor is it necessarily exclusive: 1) cases involving a matter
of constitutional right, including the Spanos rationale for out-of-state
attorneys; 2) areas affected by specifically articulated congressional
policy or dominated by the sweep of federal legislation, especially when
there is no common law antecedent or state analogue; 3) disciplinary
matters concerning which an independent federal determination must be
made; 4) a broad area, presently ill-defined, in which the rules of deci-
sion vitally affect the conduct of particular litigation before the court.
In the wake of Spanos and other recent developments the argument
for federal law will be pressed more frequently and vigorously. In time,
these categories of federal law, especially the fourth, will crystallize into
substantive federal law.
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